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PERSONAL IDENTITY AND EASTERN
THOUGHT
Abstract: This paper aims to show that the problem of personal identity is a
fundamentalquestionoftheclassicalIndianthought.Usuallywetendtothinkthatper-
sonal identity is a Western philosophical subject, and so we tend to forget the signifi-
cance of the Self (Atman) in Hinduism and even in Buddhism. The author shows how
theIndianthoughtapproachedthequestionofpersonalidentityandwhichwasthesin-
gular solution outlined in the work consensually attributed to Gotama, the Buddha.
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I
Personal identity is one of the mostcontroversial issues in the
contemporary philosophical thought. Briefly put, one can say there
are two different, though complementary, questions at stake – one
epistemological, the other metaphysical. The epistemological ques-
tion,clearlyarticulated byLockeitinhisEssay,askswhatisthenec-
essary and sufficient criterion by which we can rightly state that we
are the same person at different moments in time. The metaphysical
question consists in determining one’s fundamental nature, specifi-
cally when we ask ourselves, who we are. These questions comple-
ment one another in that when we wish to examine the concept of
“person”, and particularly our personal experience, it becomes im-
possible to dissociate it from inquiring into the reason why each of
us considers himself or herself as being the same at different mo-
ments and different situations. In Locke’s words, and I quote: “To
find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what per-
son stands for;which, Ithink, isathinking intelligent being that (…)
canconsideritselfasitself,thesamethinking thingindifferenttimes
and places.”
1
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1 Locke 1959: II, XXVII §9.Itisworthnoticing thatthemaindifficultiesfeltwhendealing
withtheissueofpersonalidentity arearguablyderived fromthesub-
jective aspect associated with the experience of the Self. In fact, if it
were possible to inquire the nature of “person” at the same manner
we inquiry the reality of any other entity, the metaphysical problem
would be that we deal with in the course of identifying objects sub-
ject to the action of time. Now, this would not make it a lesser ques-
tion, but it would certainly make it a different one.
An example: when we inquire into the identity of an artefact
or natural object, we ultimately aim at capturing its specific identity,
i.e. that which makesit the sameat different temporal instances. The
object in question would be inquired into, not from within itself, but
from an external perspective able enough to capture a distinctive es-
sence independently of the observer. As a matterof fact, this was the
methodology followed in the Western culture when the question of
the nature of “person” was first addressed. The definition of “per-
son”givenbyBoethius–“individual substanceofarationalnature”
2
– became thus paradigmatic. Whether or not it is a fortunate defini-
tion should not concerns us now; the notion to retain is that ‘person’
is inquired just as any other entity.
Now, the reason why personal identity is a difficult issue is
precisely due to the fact that the question can only make sense within
a subjective context. And herein lies the explanatory reason to why
thequestionofpersonalidentitybecamesecondtothequestionofthe
soul. Whether there existed such a thing as a soul was felt as a ques-
tion that could be addressed in the same level as other metaphysical
questions,examplesofwhichincludeknowingwhetherthereexistsa
principle that created the world, or whether our values – be they ethi-
cal or aesthetical – have universal value. The soul, however, even
when the inquiry concerned an individual soul, was thought of in
neutral and objective terms, as nothing more than a substance, which
competed with, or complemented, other substances. In other words,
thesoulcouldbereferredtoasbeingpersonal,buttheperspectivein-
quiring into it was neutral, detached and impersonal
3.
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2 “Quocirca si persona in solis substantiis est atque in his rationabilibus sub-
stantiaqueomnisnaturaestnecinuniversalibussedinindividuisconstat,repertaper-
sonae est definitio: naturae rationabilis individua substantia.” (Boethius 1973: 84).
3 The only exception is Augustine: “Throughout Augustine’s corpus we find
a strikingappreciationfor the philosophicalimportanceof what each of us expressesThe perception of this problem is translated clearly in the
work of the contemporary North–American philosopher Thomas
Nagel when he calls our attention to the fact that we can have two
radically distinct outlooks on “person”. “Given a complete descrip-
tion of the world from no particular point of view, including all the
people in it, one ofwhomis ThomasNagel, it seemson the one hand
that something has been left out, something absolutely essential re-
mains to be specified, namely which of them I am.”
4 And he adds:
“The conception of the world that seems to leave no room to me is a
familiar one that people carry around with them most of the time. It
isaconception oftheworldassimplyexisting, seenfromnoparticu-
lar perspective, no privileged point of view – as simply there, and
hence apprehensible from various points of view. This centerless
world contains everybody, and it contains not only their bodies but
their minds. So it includes TN, an individual born at certain time to
certain parents, with aspecific physical and mentalhistory,who isat
present thinking about metaphysics. It includes all the individuals in
theworld,andalltheirmentalandphysicalproperties.Infactitisthe
world, conceived from nowhere within it. But if it is supposed to be
this world, there seems to be something about it that cannot be in-
cluded in such a perspectiveless conception – the fact that one of
those persons, TN, is the locus of my consciousness, the point of
view from which I observe and act on the world.”
5
The issue of personal identity is thus one of the most delicate;
we inquire into the “feeling of the self”, which is to say, into the feel-
ingassociatedtotheexperienceeachofushasabouther/himself:into
the experience of being this – not any other – being. Now, this seems
to necessitate an act of self–consciousness, which, in turn, can only
be conceived within a first–person perspective. For this reason,
Stephane Ferret is led to consider the issue in the light of the famous
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by saying or thinking, ‘I exist.’Thus, for example in Book 2 of the dialogue On Free
Choice of the Will, Augustine seeks to show how it can be made clear, and by ‘made
clear’ he seems to mean ‘proved’, that God exists. But as his starting point for that
ambitious project he asks his interlocutorin the dialogue, Evodius, whether he, Evo-
dius,exists.‘Orareyou,perhaps,afraid”,hegoeson,“thatyouarebeingdeceivedby
my questioning?’Augustine adds, as if to reassure Evodius, ‘But if you did not exist,
it would be impossible for you to be deceived’(2.3.7.20).” (Matthews 2005: 3).
4 Nagel 1986: 54.
5 Ibid. 56.§7 of the Tractatus. In his words: “Yet, there remains a question that
unsettlesand embarrassesus, placing usin an astonishing perplexity:
‘WhyisitthatIamtheonewhoisI?’AndifIhavenotaddressedthat
which is, on all counts, the question, such is because, as Wittgenstein
put it: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”
6
My aim here will be to show how the Indian thought ap-
proached this question and which was the singular solution outlined
in the work consensually attributed to Gotama, the Buddha. I am
convinced that this specific mediation will allow us to shed a new
light on one of the most significant issues debated in Western con-
temporary thought and, by doing so, to lend a different voice to that
which, as we just heard, seems to be condemned to silence.
II
Contrary to a commonly held opinion, the personal identity
problem is a central question in the Eastern thought, particularly in
theclassical Indian thought. Itisalwaysdifficulttoaccurately estab-
lish the temporal boundaries of a given historical–cultural period.
Thatsaid,itseemstobesafetoassumethat,inglobalterms,theclas-
sical philosophy developed in the Indian subcontinent ranged from
the 7th century BC (with the elaboration of the first Upanishad)t o
the 11th century of our era, notably, with the elaboration of the
Viœitâdvaita Vedânta, i.e. the system of “qualified non–dualism” by
the philosopher Râmânuja.
Running the obvious risk of oversimplifying matters, it would
not be unreasonable to say that this period of intense speculative re-
flection was dominated by one question alone: what is the nature of
the reality of the world around us, and which implications as to our
personal destiny can one extract fromthe answer to that question? On
the methodologies followed, this period witnesses the cultivation of
several styles, ranging between decisively cryptic aphorisms, on the
one extreme, and strictly rational logic treatises, on the other. The dif-
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6 “Avrai dire, il est encore une question qui nous hante et qui nous met dans
un embarras et une perplexité inouïe: ‘Pourquoi est–ce moi qui suis moi?’Si je n’ai
pásabordecequiserait,àbiendeségards,laquestion,c’estque, commeditWittgen-
stein,‘cedontonnepeutparler,ilfautletaire’(TractatusLogico–philosophicus,7).”
(Ferret 1993: 20 n. 2).ferentphilosophicalschools–typicallycalled“darœanas”,i.e.“points
of view” – also varied according to their lesser or fuller adherence to
the religious principles observed in the Indian society of the time.
Themaindifferencebetweentheseschoolsasawholeandthe
Westernphilosophical traditionliesinaconcern–eithermoreorless
explicit – with soteriology. The ultimate nature of reality is inquired
inthatsuchinquirycanbringforthananswertothemainlongings of
human nature, and thus offer a framework as to how one should act.
It thus seems to me that Jean–François Revel’s thesis is sound when
he compares the Indian “darœanas” with the ancient Hellenic scho-
ols, pointing out the latter’s endeavour to interconnect metaphysical
reflection with practical wisdom
7.
The landmark of classical Indian philosophy consists in the
elucidation of a concept designated by “âtman” – a word that, in most
contexts, can be perfectly translated as Self. The term “âtman” is a
Sanskrit word and given that Sanskrit is Indo–European language we
can find equivalent words in Western languages – the German verb
“atmen”, for instance, or the nouns “der Atem” and “das Atmen”, all
of which typically refer the notion of breathing. This is, in fact, the
common meaning of atman that we find in the first Upanishads
8.
Wefrequentlyfindtheword“âtman”beingusedtoexpressthe
notion of a living body, which reflects the idea that the ultimate crite-
rion of life lies in a continuous flow of breathing. It should be noted
that the body here intended could be mythically dimensioned as the
“body of the world”, of which all beings are but its organic parts.
Âtman’s more interesting meaning in the specific context of the
Upanishads mentioned, is, however, that which results from its si-
multaneously reflexive and subjective aspect. The word “âtman” is
originally a reflexive pronoun, masculine gender, which remotely
stands for the act of “extending something” (*tan), bearing the pecu-
liar property of imparting a “corporeal personality (tanû) that indi-
vidualises and subjectivises beings”
9. This conjugation of reflexive
pronoun and living bodyexplains whywhat we are dealing with here
is not just an anima, as in the Western classical culture; rather, what
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7 Revel J.–F./Ricard, M. 1999: 24–25.
8 I speak here, of course, of the Bºhadâraòyaka Upanishad (BU) and of the
Chândogya Upanishad (CU) – two texts consensually acknowledged as
pre–Buddhist. Cf. Olivelle 1998.
9 Rossi 2003: 68.we face here is a concept that holds a personal aspect
10, “purua” (per-
son),whichdenotesareflexiveandexperientialsingularitypresentin
each of us, even if, in some passages, it can be conceived as a “World
Soul”.Itshouldbepointedputthatnocontradictionensuesfromthis:
one can refuse the notion of an individual soul – which, incidentally,
is conveyed in Sanskrit by the word jîva – and, at the same time, as-
sumethatsuchacorporealsouloftheworldisneitherneutralnorim-
personal. For reasons to be addressed later, the important thing is to
never loose sight of the reflexive character of the word.
When we wish to convey the notion of reflexive action in a
statement, we can use the word âtman. For example: the statement
“she hurt herself” is rendered in Sanskrit as “âtmânam sâ hanti”.
Âtman is, clearly, a reflexive experience. In mythical–poetic terms,
within the religious context of the Vedic hymns, the âtman – i.e., the
Self – is the cosmogonic principle, which provides determination to
that which, in the night of time, was undetermined. This latter di-
mension is expressed in one of fundamental hymnsof the Vedic cos-
mogony(ªgVedaX:129)–oneoftheoldestreligioustextsknownto
humanity. “In the beginning even nothingness was not, nor exis-
tence. There was no air then, nor the heavens beyond it. What cov-
ered it? Where was it? In whose keeping? (...) The One breathed
windlessly and self–sustaining (...) At first there was only darkness
wrapped by darkness (...) The sages who have searched their hearts
withwisdomknowthatwhichis,iskintothatwhichisnot.Andthey
have stretched their cord across the void, and know what was above,
and what below.” And the poem of creation ends with this fabulous
adversative: “But, after all, who knows, and who can say whence it
all came,and how creation happened? The gods themselves are later
than creation so who knows truly whence it has arisen (...) Whence
all creation had its origin, he, whether he fashioned it or whether he
did not, he, who surveys it all from highest heaven, he knows – or
maybeeven he does not know.” This uncertainty, unique within reli-
gious thought, is not just the voice of a sceptic; it bears a metaphysi-
cal correlate in the mythological characterisation of the first princi-
ple as it itself being an interrogation.
In mythological terms, the secret name of the demiurge is the
first consonant in the Sanskrit syllabary: “ka”. And “ka” means, lit-
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10 BU 1.4.1.erally, the question “who?”. It is easier to understand now the Self’s
(or âtman’s) role in the determination of the inchoative principle of
everything that exists. To the question of “who” (ka) performs any
given action, the answer follows straightforwardly, in that when we
ask ourselves “who breathes in the act of breathing?”, “who sees in
the act of seeing?”, “who thinks in the act of thinking?”, “who lives
in the act of living?”, the answer is invariably the same: the Self
(âtman)does.Andwhy?BecausetheSelfisbutthepureprinciple of
reflexivity of that which, by nature, is undetermined and unsubstan-
tial. Whence does the energy, or the force, that provides reflexivity
to the original indetermination come? Here again, the Vedic texts do
not equivocate: such creative energy is called Brahman. The entire
Vedic–sacrificial culture of ancient India prior to the constitution of
Hinduism, i.e., prior to the “santana dharma” (“eternal law”), rests
upon this notion; so much so that the priestly cast calls itself
Brahmanic (brâhamaòa), and one of the most common names to re-
fer the demiurge is Brahma – a name in which the original Brahman
naturally echoes.
Theword“brahman”isaneuternoun.ItsIndo–Europeanroot
– *bºh – is associated with the significations of force, growth, cre-
ative energy. Within this sacrificial tradition, it assumes a twofold
meaning. On the one hand, it stands for the nourishment offered to
thegods,whichnotonlystrengthens themasitalsoenablesacontin-
uous regeneration of the cosmos; on the other hand, it is the ritual
word that assures the very effectiveness of the offering. This power
of the word – common, as it is, to several mythologies – stems, at
leastintheVedicspeculative tradition, fromthebeliefinthecreative
force of the sound vibration. All different gradations of being are
nothing more than vibratory expressions, or vibratory variations, of
one same sound – which clearly brings this metaphysical intuition
closertothewell–knownOrphic–Pythagorean speculations inWest-
ern philosophy. Brahman is the vibration, which unifies all beings –
a signification thus close to the meaning conveyed by the neo–Pla-
tonic One.Itunifies and structures, i.e. itimpartsdharma (or“law”),
ºta (or “order”) to the entire cosmos; it does so in that it is an energy
capable of mapping and determining the indeterminate principle –
the absolute vacuum – by means of giving it reflexivity and experi-
ence of itself; in one word, by giving it Self.
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9The first Upanishads render an explicit examination of this
poetic–cosmogonic notion and the thesis it introduces stands as one
of the most original conceptions of speculative philosophy ever. Its
starting point is well known and can be found in all philosophia
perennis.I fbrahmanispresentin,andsustains,allformswithoutex-
ception, then it itself cannot prima facie have any definite form. As
Spinozawillanalogouslysay,everydeterminationoftheinfinitesub-
stanceis,simultaneously,onemodeofthesubstanceanditsnegation.
The negative path appears to be the only one opened to the human
thought, in that the only way to glimpse at the absolute appears to be
the extreme negation of all possible determinations. Up to this point,
“there is nothing new under the sun”, to quote the Ecclesiastes’s
well–known phrase. The novel aspect will be found in the following
idea: given that every objective determination carries with it a nega-
tion of brahman’s own essence, why not look for the solution in our
ownsubjectiveidentity?Afterall,thedeterminationoftheinchoative
andindeterminateprinciple–theka–isselfhood,whichmanifestsas
Self (âtman). And, if this is the case, why not identify brahman,t h e
creative and unifying energy, with âtman, the internal experience
present in each and all of us? If brahman is present in every modality
of being, then we can trivially conclude that it is present in our inner
nature; the neuter mode of the Absolute – the “it” of brahman – can
be seen as its most personal mode and vice–versa. Hence the persis-
tent reiteration throughout the Chândogya Upanishad of the most fa-
mous proposition of the Indian thought: “That is the Self. And that’s
how you are”
11. It is, indeed, in this “that’s how you are” (tat [that] –
tvam [you] – asi [are]) that the identity between brahman and âtman
isdecided;thisisthedeclarationthatsustainsthefundamentalprinci-
ple of the most influential Indian philosophical school – known as
Vedânta, precisely because it materialises the intuition expressed in
the final texts of the Vedas: the Upanishads – and which will find in
Shankara’s philosophy its most radical expression. “But, it may be
asked, is brahman known or not known? (...) the existence of brah-
manisknownonthegroundofitsbeingtheSelfofeveryone.Forev-
ery one is conscious of the existence of his Self, never thinks ‘I am
not’. And this Self is brahman.”
12
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11 CU 6.8.7 and ff.
12 Shankara 1962: 14.III
It is widely accepted that the doctrine developed by Gotama,
the Buddha, was part of the intense philosophical debate about the
Upanishads that was ongoing in the late 6th century B.C.
13. How-
ever, it is also undisputable that the philosophical inquiry on the na-
ture of the Self (âtman; atta – também attâ ou attan – in Pali) is one
of the most controversial issues in the Buddhist doctrine. The dis-
agreement in question concerned the meaning of personal identity
within the primitive Buddhism. In order to illustrate this conflict of
interpretations, I chose two paradigmatic statements as example.
One was voiced by the Sinhalese master Walpola Rahula and can be
found in his high–ranking book What the Buddha Taught; it says:
“AccordingtotheteachingoftheBuddha,theideaofselfisanimag-
inary, false belief which has no corresponding reality, and it pro-
duces harmful thoughts of ‘me’ and ‘mine’”
14. The opposing claim
comes from the German Buddhist philosopher Georg Grimm; it
says: “The Buddha has drawn this dividing line between attâ and
anattâ, between I and not–I with great exactness. (…) He says:
‘What I perceive originating and perishing, that cannot be my I, my
Ego;’and this statement will certainly not be doubted by any think-
ing creature.”
15
Contradictory theses seem to co–exist even within the reli-
gious practice. In his book Selfless Persons, Steven Collins, referring
totheTherâvadaschool–aBuddhistschoolnowadaysstilldominant
in countries as Burma/Myanmar, Thailand or Sri Lanka – tells us that
“there is a radical refusal to speak of a self or permanent person”
16.
On the other hand, Roland Rech, former president of the Interna-
tional Zen Association, does not hesitate to emphasize the signifi-
cance not only of the Self, but also of the “ego”. In his words: “[The
ego]isthesubject“I”ofthefirstperson.Itisimportantthatitformsit-
self, lest the subject be exposed to serious psychological problems,
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13 Schumann 1982: 49ff.
14 Rahula 1959: 51.
15 “Der Buddho hat diesen Trennungsstrich zwischen attâ und annattâ – Ich
undNicht–Ich–ganzgenaugezogen.(...) ersagt:‘WobeiicheinEntstehenundVer-
gehen wahrnehme, das kann nicht mein Selbst, men Ich sein’– und diesen Satz wird
wohl kein denkendes Wesen in Zweifel ziehen.” Grimm 1976: 94–95.
16 Collins 1982: 78.suchaspsychoticepisodesorschizophrenia.(…)Theegoisadimen-
sion that needs to be accessed if one is to live as a human being. (…)
Theegoisnotresponsibleforallourmisfortunes;rather,itisaneces-
sarysteppingstoneinachievingindividuality,humanity.”
17Thelatter
interpretation concurs with that of another great Zen master, Taïsen
Deshimaru, who says we should “know our true ego”
18, also known
asthe“objectiveego”
19.Othersattempttodifferentiatethenotionsof
“ego” and “Self”, trying to show that, when it comes to the three
seals, or marks, of existence (tilakkhandha), namely, impermanence
(anicca), “suffering” (dukkha) and “non–self” (anattâ), Gotama, the
Buddha, intends the third term as negating one of the two concepts –
either the ego or the self – but never both simultaneously.
We are thus likely to find those who, like Christmas Hum-
phreys (1969) and Caroline Rhys Davids (1914), believe that
Siddhata Gotama never denied the notion of an eternal Self, but
merely that of an individual ego or soul, and we are equally likely to
find those forwhomthe anattâ thesis isto be understood asnegation
of the Self, but not as negation of the “I”. Finally, we may also find
those who follow the doctrine of the Indian Buddhist philosopher
Nâgârjuna, who founded the significant Mâdhyamika school in the
3rd century A.D.. According to Nâgârjuna, the Self is, in absolute
but not in relative terms, devoid of essence, as is, in fact, everything
that exists. This claim led some of his contemporary interpreters to
favour“non–essence” over“non–self”astheaccuratetranslation for
anattâ
20. The question at stake would then be not as much the nega-
tionoftheexperience oftheself,asactuallytoshowthatthe“feeling
of the Self”, similarly to all other beings in the world (named
“dharmas” in the primitive Buddhism), would be devoid of an au-
tonomous and independent essence. This was, in fact, the meaning
established by Nâgârjuna for the Buddhist theory of “emptiness”
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17 “[L’ego] c’est le sujet ‘je’de la première personne. Il est important que cet
ego se constitue sinon le sujet encourt des graves problèmes psychiques tels les états
psychotiques ou la schizophrénie. (…) L’ego est une dimension à laquelle il est né-
cessaired’accéder pour vivre commeun sujet humain. (…) L’ego n’estpas responsi-
ble de tous nos maux, l’ego est un passage nécessaire pour l’accession à
l’individualité, à l’humanité.” (Rech 1994: 109).
18 “(...) connaître votre véritable ego.” (Deshimaru 1984: 28).
19 “Ainsi l’ego objectif est le bon esprit.” (29).
20 Garfield 1995: 89.(úûnyatâ), expressing the idea of a radical and infinite interdepen-
dence among all forms of being, to the extent that everything that is
is anattâ, i.e. devoid of an essence of their own.
Our purpose is here to contribute to this philosophical debate
by attempting to clarify the meaning of Gotama’s, the Buddha, doc-
trine on personal identity and experience of the Self. This purpose
obviously requires that our first step is to examine how the founder
of the Buddhism situates the concept of non–self. Being one of the
core concepts of Buddha’s thought, its elucidation is developed in
several – and quite different – moments in the Canon. The crucial
moment is the discourse known as “Anattâ Sutta”. We know that we
are before one of Buddhism’s fundamental text because we find it in
two different moments of the Pali Canon (Vinaya Piþaka I 13–14;
Sutta Piþaka – Samyutta Nikâya 22:59). According to tradition, this
text corresponds to the second sermon given by Gotama, the Bud-
dha, right after the announcement of what is known as the “four no-
ble truths” (cattâri ariyasaccâni), namely, the truths about “suffer-
ing”, its origin, its “cessation” and the “path to cessation”. In this
new discourse, also delivered at the Deer Park, in the area of
Vârânasî (or Benares), Gotama, the Buddha, focus his analysis on
the constitutive elements of personality, or, in a broader sense, of
person. Let us consider some significant passages of this founding
textoftheBuddhisttradition,inwhichwewilltranslateattâasSelf.
“The Buddha addressed the group of five disciples: ‘Form is
non–self.Forifformwereself,thisformwouldnotleadtosuffering,
and it would be possible to say: let my form be thus; let my form not
be thus. (...) Feeling is non–self. For if feeling were self (...) it would
be possible to say: let my feeling be thus; let my feeling not be thus.
(...) Perception is non–self. For if perception were self (...) it would
be possible to say: let my perception be thus; let my perception not
be thus. (...) Emotions (volitional formations) are non–self. For if
emotions were self (...) it would be possible to say: let my emotions
be thus; let my feeling not be thus. (...) Consciousness is non–self.
Forifconsciousness wereself(...)itwould bepossible tosay:let my
consciousness be thus; let my consciousness not be thus. (...) There-
fore any kind of form, feeling, perception, emotion, and conscious-
ness, whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or exter-
nal,grossorsubtle, inferiororsuperior,farornear,should beseenas
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9it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘this is not mine, this I am not,
this is not my Self.”
Gotama, the Buddha, ponders on our personal experience as
beings in the world, asking himself what do we mean when we state
the simple proposition “we are”. He reaches the conclusion that our
experience comprises five fundamental attributes, all of which condi-
tioned, impermanent and impersonal. Were it untrue, i.e., if the differ-
ent features of each individual’s personality were indeed ours,d e -
pendent on each of us, and if the Self resided in such features, then
they would be able to assume the form, or the property, we wished
them to assume – which is, obviously enough, not the case. The fun-
damental properties that constitute our existence, i.e., the manner in
which we manifest ourselves both to ourselves and to others, are not
unconditioned attributes we ourselves possess; rather, and in
Gotama’sexactwords,theyare“clusters”,or“bundles”,(khandha)of
experience – which very nature is impermanent and evanescent. The
experience of the Self that is given in the existence of a personality
comprises five conditioned attributes, namely, corporeal form (rûpa),
sensations (vedanâ), perceptions (saññâ), emotions (sankhâra)a n d
consciousness (viññâna) .T h e s ef i v ec l u s t e r s( pañca khandha) deter-
mine all the body and mental phenomena of our contingent and finite
experience. The North–American Buddhist philosopher Robert
Thurman gives us vivid images of each of the mentioned elements:
“We begin by looking at the body. We can (...) thump our
chests and say, ‘I’m me’, but surely we are not just a bunch of ribs.
We look in the mirror and say, ‘There I am’, but we say the same
thing when we see old snapshots of ourselves (...) We can explore
cells, axons, and dendrites; molecules, DNA, and RNA; atoms, sub-
atomic quantum particles, unnameable forces and energies. No-
where we can find anything still, static, independent. (…) We can
moveon to our mindsand begin by sifting through our feelings, sen-
sations, pleasures, pains, or numbnesses. (...) I investigate my sen-
sory surfaces and, after some time, give up finding any stable,
self–sufficient ‘I’anywhere along them. Then we can move into im-
ages, words, symbols, ideas, concepts, mental pictures. This at first
seems promising. ‘I’ is a word, after all. The names ‘Alice’, ‘Joe’,
‘Carol’,and ‘Shakyamuni’all arenouns. When Ipronounce myown
name,‘Bob’,doesanimageofmyselfariseinmymind?Isitarecent
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vorite logo? Atrademark? Asymbol? (...) None touches the essence
of ‘me’. (...) We can move deeper into the motions of the mind, into
emotions. When ‘I’ love or am in love, I feel powerfully present,
even in the moment of feeling that solidity melting. When ‘I’hate, I
am carried away by destructive impulses (...) – all these energies
seemtotake hold of‘me’,orseemtoemanatefrom‘I’.ButasIthink
them through, observe them in actuality or in memory, they seem
fullybound inrelationships. (...)Atlastwecometoawarenessitself,
tolookatourveryconsciousness(...)Buttoturntowardmycenterof
awareness,Ihavetotellmyawarenesstoturnbackonitself”
21.What
wecansayisthatourpersonalityisbuttheresultofacombinationof
those five elements – to the point that the belief in its autonomy and
permanence ends up being a suffering–causing illusion. In none of
the mentioned clusters would we be able to detect the presence of an
autonomous and unconditioned subject; therefore, the insistence in
any of them will necessarily lead to suffering.
Whenwesearchforourselvesamidstthedifferentconditioned
factors of our personality, it would seem that we are bound to find a
specific sensation, or a specific emotion, but never the Self. At first
glance, Gotama’s, the Buddha, position appears to be quite in synch
with David Hume’s thesis on personal identity: “When I enter most
intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particu-
lar perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred,
pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a per-
ception, and never can observe anything but the perception.”
22 It is
easyto understand whythe Selfcould have been seen as an illusion –
at best as a conventional name to refer the set of experiences we have
on the world. However, a more careful analysis not only of the dis-
course on the non–self, but of other Buddhist sermons in the Pali
Canon as well, shows us that this interpretation, albeit undoubtedly
popularinthecontemporaryBuddhistcommunity,is,Ibelieve,hasty.
What the texts do show us is that Siddhattha Gotama was ex-
tremely careful not to hint at, let alone propose, a particular view on
the nature of our own identity and of the Self (or attâ). The Ânanda
Sutta (SN 44:10) presents us with an interesting dialogue between
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21 Thurman 1998: 74–79.
22 Hume 1972: 301–302.the Buddha and the traveller Vacchagotta. The latter asks whether
there is a Self (âtman ou attâ), to which Gotama remains silent;
Vacchagota then asks “Are you saying, Master Gotama, that there is
no Self?”, to which the Buddha maintains his silence. When that
traveller bid goodbye, Ânanda asked the master on the reason for
that silence. The master told him that, had he asserted the existence
of a Self, he would have been assuming a position identical to the
thesis claimed by those he called “eternalists” (sassata–vâda), i.e.,
thosewhoclaimthateachbeingpossessesanindividual soul,eternal
and incorruptible; on the other hand, had he denied the existence of
theSelf,hewouldhavebeenassumingapositionidenticaltothethe-
sis advocated by those he called “abolitionists” (uccheda–vâda), to
whom personal identity was just an illusion. The abolitionist inter-
pretation had a huge impact on the history of Buddhism, mostly due
to the decisive influence of the Buddhaghosa – an Indian medieval
monkwiththeTheravâdaschool,authorofthisschool’smostsignif-
icant work, the Visuddhimagga (The Path of Purification). This
work includes a statement which was later to become famed: “for
there is suffering, but none who suffers”
23, which means that that
which we call ‘person’would be just a chain supported by the clus-
ters, or, to quote William James’ well–known phrase, a “chain of
consciousness”. That said, Gotama had clearly stated in the
Sabbâsava Sutta (MN 2:6) that “when one reflects without wisdom
[…] the vision ‘no Self exists for me’emerges as true”.
Oneofthemostinteresting theories attemptingtoexplain this
attitude ofGotama,theBuddha,bringsitclosertothesolution estab-
lished later on in the West by the Kantian tradition. There are two
distinct aspects to this solution. On the one hand, to show that
Hume’s thesis on the inexistence of a Self is unsustainable, for if it
were true one would have to accept that there could be predicates –
sensations, emotions, etc. – without a subject of which they could be
predicates of. Simon Blackburn has recently addressed this notion,
ironically observing that to state it would be as sensible as stating
that the bumps in a smashed car could exist in the absence of the car,
or that the Cheshire cat could, as it does in Lewis Carroll’s novel,
vanish while leaving its smile intact
24. On the other hand, however,
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23 Buddhaghosa 1975: 521 (XVI: 90).
24 Blackburn 1999: 136.Gotama, the Buddha, seems to acknowledge that the Self of our ex-
periences cannot be known at all, and that we can only say that it ex-
ists as something that accompanies all representations.
This interpretation of the Buddha’s thesis on the Self (for its
most part argued by Sue Hamilton, 2000) is, no doubt, quite a prom-
ising one. Gotama, the Buddha, does seem to favour a deafening si-
lence when it comes to basic metaphysical questions. Example: be-
fore questions like the eternal nature, or the finiteness, of the world
(MN 72: 3–14), his answer is invariably mute, be that silence
grounded on ethical–moral reasons (what purpose is there for a man
who finds himself seriously injured by a arrow to inquire into the
material the arrow was made of, or the size of the bow, or the assail-
ant’s personality or his physiognomy,… ?) (MN 63:5), or on the be-
lief that the best solutions are never the extreme ones. In the
Nidânasamyutta (SN 12:15), in a passage concerning the World and
ofSelf,Gotamasays:“’Everything exists’[…]isanextreme.’Noth-
ing exists’is another extreme. Refraining from leaning towards any
of these, [the Buddha] teaches the Dharma through the middle
[path]”. But, ifthis isso,i.e,ifthe speculative path leads ustoadead
end, if it is wrong to state metaphysical propositions concerning the
nature of the Self, or attâ, why, then, does the Buddha proclaim the
doctrine of non–self (anattâ) in the quoted discourse?
Following a neo–Kantian interpretation of the text, such is to
be understood as an epistemological strategy aimed at showing us
that the elements conditioning the experience – and, ultimately, ev-
eryphenomena, ordharma –aredevoid ofSelf.SueHamiltonoffers
us an enlightening analogy on Gotama’s purpose
25. Imagine a situa-
tion in which a computer salesman is trying to teach us how a spe-
cific software programme works. Now, instead of listening atten-
tively to the teachings of the salesman, we become mesmerised by
the computer itself. While he patiently attempts to describe what we
are required to do for that software to run smoothly, we are con-
stantly interrupting him with questions regarding the different com-
ponents of the computer and asking him if any of them is the com-
puter. We point to the keyboard and ask: “Is this the computer?”, to
which the salesman answers that it is not and attempts to resume his
explanation. Unwisely, though, we insist on interrupting him and,
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25 Hamilton 2000: 24.pointing to the monitor, to the operative system, to the memory, we
ask him time and again “Is this the computer?”. Now, as Hamilton
sagely points out: “Given my fascination, I am very puzzled about
this, and though I continue to speculate as to exactly what the com-
puter is, I also have the very distinct impression fromwhat the sales-
man kept saying that there is really no such thing at all. It takes me a
while to realise that what the computer was not was not what the
salesman was trying to tell me.”
26 If we do look at the Anattâ Sutta
carefully, we can see that what the Buddha is doing is cumulatively
denying that each of the elements conditioning our experience is, in
itself, our identity.
Reading thetext accordingly,alldescriptions wemayattempt
tomakeabout the world, including ourownpersonal world, arecon-
ditioned by the factors determining the experience. This is tanta-
mount to saying that any proposition about the nature of something
thatfallsoutsidethescopeofexperiencerunstheriskofsayingnoth-
ing at all. That is why most theories on personal identity amount to
eithertryingtoerroneouslyconvinceusthateachoftheconditioning
factors is, in itself, that very identity, or that personal identity is just
an illusion – stating, for instance, that memory, or the body, is the
genuinecriterionofidentity,orthatthesubjectisbutmultiplicityde-
void of unity.
Albeit agreeing with many of the claims made by the
neo–Kantian interpretation ofBuddhism,Ibelieve wecangofurther
whenitcomestotheunderstanding oftheSelf.Fortworeasons:one,
because in crucial moments of the Canon, Buddha uses the concept
ofSelf–attâ–astheultimatereferentofhisinquiry,andnotjustasa
mere grammatical expedient, as is argued by Peter Harvey
27. Let us
seesomeexemplarypassages.Inhislastdiscourse(DN16:2.26),the
Buddha addresses Ânanda saying: “You should become yourself
(attâ) in your island, you yourself (attâ) being the refuge and having
nothing else as your refuge”. In the Dhammapada, an aphoristic
work deemed critical in Buddhist studies, an entire section is de-
voted to the issue of the Self (attâ). And when can read in it: “The
Self is indeed the lord of the Self; who else indeed could be lord?”;
“If one knew the self to be dear, one would guard it well” (XII).
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26 24.
27 Harvey 1995: 19.There is, however, a second reason leading me to consider
that itispossible tostate the existence ofanexperience ofthe Self.It
is, in fact, an intuition crucial for Gotama, the Buddha, which Des-
cartes will later cometo assumein Western philosophy. We can only
experience the finite, the contingent, the impermanent, and that is
because we have the ability to sustain their contrary. “There is a
not–born, not–become, a not–made, a not–compound. If that un-
born, not–become, not–made, not–compounded were not, there
would be no escape from what is born, become, made, com-
pounded.” (Udâna 80)
The experience of the clusters’finite and limited character is
possible only insofar as we all have the ability to experience its con-
trary. Now, if there is an experience of the Self, why, then, has
Gotama elected to keep silent on its nature? My answer to this ques-
tionwouldbethus:becauseexperiencing theSelfisanalogous toex-
periencing the void. The Self is the experience of the void within the
World. Robert Thurman, in the work mentioned earlier, also points
inthisdirection andIwillborough hiswordsforclosing mycommu-
nication: “a voidness melting in a voidness. We can reassure our-
selves that any voidness is not solid, but at the same time it is not
nothing and cannot obstruct our awareness. (…) We loose all sense
of boundary, all tension of struggle (…) This is the real self (…) em-
bracing all others without neglecting ourselves. This is the essence
of what the Buddha saw during his own meditation.”
28?
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Carlos  oao Korea
LIÈNI IDENTITET I ISTOÈNJAÈKA MISAO
Rezime
Namera ovog tekstajesteda poka eda jeproblem liènogidentitetatemeljno
pitanje klasiène indijske misli. Uobièajeno, skloni smo mišljenju da je lièni identitet
tema zapadne filozofije, te tako skloni smo da zaboravimo znaèaj sopstva (Atman) u
hinduizmu, pa èak i u budizmu. Autor pokazuje kako je indijska filozofija pristupala
pitanju liènog identiteta i koje je konkretno rešenje izlo eno u delima koja se obièno
pripisuju Gotami Budi.
Kljuène reèi: lièni identitet, sopstvo, budizam, hinduizam, Atman, Buda.
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